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AEDPA Mea Culpa

Sadly, the surrounding politics didn’t make for careful
vetting. There doubtless were drafts and drafting conferences, but nothing approaching genuine, hard-headed
sessions with specialists on both sides of the policy divide.
We should have expected the mishigas we got.
For my money, though, the Supreme Court bears the
lion’s share of the blame for its approach to interpreting
AEDPA’s provisions. The Court’s methodology, not compelled but deliberately chosen by the justices, produced the
colossal mess that federal habeas corpus has become. Specifically, the justices did two things, both of them wrong.
First, they typically focused on the text of AEDPA
provisions without sufficient attention to the policy implications. Much has been written about the Court’s turn to
“textualism” in statutory construction. The idea, championed notoriously by Justice Scalia, is that Congress’s
authority for lawmaking demands that courts effectuate
the plain meaning the text of a statute conveys, however
troubling the consequences. The text is the product of
political bargaining that cannot be recovered and can only
be respected for what it was—namely, democracy at its
ugly best. At all events, any policy considerations are not
for the judiciary but for the legislative process.
The conventional response is that statutory language
is often not clear at all, but rather demands interpretive
effort that courts are in business to provide. When the
Supreme Court invokes dictionary definitions and disclaims policy, it doesn’t respect the legislative function. It
prevents Congress from relying on the entirely reasonable
expectation that a statute will be read to further sensible,
discernible legislative will. The decisions interpreting
AEDPA prove what happens when the Court declares that
the text of a statute has an unavoidable meaning and that
responsibility for bad outcomes must be attributed to
inscrutable politics. AEDPA was never a package of finely
tuned measures advancing policies adopted via hard political negotiations. This statute was slapped together when
there was a fleeting opportunity not to treat with political
adversaries. All too often, the justices played the “gotcha”
game—formally acknowledging Congress’s authority to
make policy, but frustrating any plausible objective by
reading admittedly badly written statutory provisions as
an exercise in grammar.

Larry
Yackle
Professor of Law,
Boston University
Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/fsr/article-pdf/24/4/330/134924/fsr_2012_24_4_330.pdf by Boston University user on 20 April 2022

It’s all my fault. In an early article, Mark Tushnet and I
predicted that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) would prove to be a largely
symbolic enactment, albeit generating the occasional
untoward outcome.1 Mark is absolved. We collaborated in
a single piece, but I had responsibility for our projections
about AEDPA. I doubt that anybody at the Court was so
much as aware of our paper. But I tempted fate, and fate
reacted. This statute has been a conceptual and practical
nightmare—crippling the ability of federal courts to
enforce federal rights, disserving legitimate state interests,
delivering unjust and bizarre results even in the run of
ordinary cases, and, at best, squandering resources on
endless and pointless procedural digressions.
Our calamitous experience over the last fifteen years
does not want for less cosmic explanations. In Supreme
Court cases since 1996, as in earlier cases, the treatment of
habeas corpus questions can only be appraised in light of
the death penalty, which typically hovers in the background.
To many of us, federal habeas is a vitally important vehicle
by which federal courts enforce federal law in capital and
noncapital cases alike. But to many others, off and (I think)
on the Court, habeas is little more than a means by which
inmates on death row contrive to postpone the inevitable.
So when the justices appear to be quarreling about some
aspect of habeas law, they may best be understood to be
waging a proxy battle over capital punishment. Here, as in
so many other contexts, we translate obdurate questions of
substantive value into ostensibly more tractable procedural
issues—in this instance, whether federal judges should
have authority to adjudicate matters that were or might have
been resolved in state court. This is a common observation,
and it undoubtedly has real explanatory power.
Coming to AEDPA in particular, everybody acknowledges that the drafters goofed. They didn’t understand
habeas as it stood at the time and so wrote provisions that
could not easily be integrated with arrangements left
unchanged. They borrowed haphazardly from various earlier bills without accounting for overlaps and gaps, and,
into the bargain, they concocted new language that defied
any sensible interpretation at all. I will say that the drafters
were given a monumental task that would have been hard
to complete successfully in the best of circumstances.
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I.

In the years preceding 1996, Congress considered numerous bills meant to curtail state convicts’ use of federal
habeas corpus to challenge their convictions and sentences collaterally. In many minds, legislation was needed
to discourage prisoners from abusing the writ by needlessly postponing federal habeas petitions, withholding
claims or factual allegations from state courts and saving
them for the federal forum, filing multiple applications for
federal relief, and, perhaps most important, launching and
maintaining federal litigation for the sole purpose of
delaying execution of capital sentences. On top of these
concerns about the habeas process, critics advanced
checks on the substance of the federal courts’ work—
namely, in their view, the authority of federal judges to
substitute their judgments about federal rights for the
contrary judgments of state courts (especially decisions
about the validity of death sentences).
Not everyone was convinced that these concerns were
justified. Lots of organizations and individuals lined up
to rebut them. There was no evidence that clever prison
inmates, most proceeding pro se, were in any way deliberately gaming the system. And when federal courts came to
the merits of prisoners’ claims, they typically endorsed the
conclusions previously reached in state court. In the end,
as is often the case, it proved to be harder to enact legislation than to defeat it. All legislative efforts to circumscribe
federal habeas corpus were forestalled.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court addressed its own concerns about the federal writ in decisional law. Acting on an
assumed authority to make “equitable” modifications in
habeas arrangements under existing statutes, the Court
established tough standards for prisoners’ obligation to
exhaust state remedies before filing applications for
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federal habeas corpus, strict limits on prisoners’ ability to
seek federal relief on the basis of claims or factual allegations that had not been advanced properly in state court,
and similar restrictions on second or successive federal
petitions. Most important, the Court held in Teague v.
Lane 2 that claims based on “new” rules of federal law
would no longer be cognizable in federal court at all,
save in exceptional cases unlikely to arise.
Like the restrictive bills advanced in Congress, these
decisions by the Supreme Court evoked opposition. The
difference was that legislative action could be resisted
politically, but judicial decisions were law. The only path
open to friends of the writ was to argue in future cases
that the Court’s innovations were dangerous and should
be limited rather than extended. In particular, the justices
were urged to restrict “new” rules for Teague purposes to
genuinely novel shifts in federal law that state courts could
not easily anticipate.3 In short order, however, the Court
declared that any rule of law was “new” in Teague-speak if,
at the time a petitioner’s conviction and sentence became
final on direct review, a state court might reasonably have
determined a claim against him. By virtue of this (remarkable) notion of what counted as “new” in habeas corpus,
federal courts were deprived of the ability to entertain
familiar claims that state courts had (or might have)
rejected incorrectly (but not unreasonably).4
Whatever their wisdom, the Court’s initiatives defused
any genuine argument for congressional action to deal with
federal habeas. Yet the pent-up desire to curb the writ legislatively lived on, and when Republicans campaigned for
control of the House in 1994 they made habeas corpus
“reform” part of their signature “Contract with America.”
Then, when Congress was searching for some way to
respond to the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the Republican leadership seized the opportunity finally to enact a
habeas bill—not (let’s be honest) to deal with “terrorism” in
any recognizable form, but rather to satisfy long-standing
objections to federal collateral attacks on state criminal
judgments. This notwithstanding that the Court had already
met the same concerns without benefit of legislation.
It was in these circumstances that I contended that
AEDPA would be understood as a symbolic gesture. The
judicial train had arrived at the station ahead of the legislative train, and the only point of a statute now was to grasp
political credit for limitations already in place. I predicted,
accordingly, that the Court would treat the new statute
largely as an endorsement of the (recently established) status quo. I acknowledged that the justices might hesitate to
read AEDPA always to codify existing case law, lest they be
charged with giving the statute no practical effect at all. Yet
construing AEDPA to make dramatic changes would disrupt the justices’ own agenda. I recognized that AEDPA’s
many provisions would not always fit neatly into extant
arrangements and that new statutory language would occasionally produce freakish results in individual cases. But in
the main I thought the new statute would have little impact
on the Court’s previously chosen program.
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Second, the justices insisted that every AEDPA provision, in turn, had to be read to alter habeas law in some
way (usually to the disadvantage of habeas petitioners).
This different, though related, feature of the Court’s
approach to the new statute was peculiarly inapt, not only
because the provisions to be construed were poorly conceived and drafted but also because the Court itself had
recently made manifest changes in the habeas landscape
and there was no reason to think that anyone in Congress
meant those changes to be adjusted.
Here’s a roadmap for this essay. In Part I, I will
rehearse the conditions that led me to believe that AEDPA
would not affect the habeas we knew all so much. In this,
I will suggest what the Court might have done with this
new statute to avoid the woeful results we have actually
suffered. In Part II, I will describe some of the Court’s
decisions touching procedural matters (by no means all),
which demonstrate, I think, the madness the justices’
method has brought upon us. Finally, in Part III, I will
turn to the Court’s work regarding more substantive limits
on the ability of federal courts to vindicate meritorious federal claims when they appear.
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It was not to be. What I had expected would be unfortunate exceptions became routine. It was as though the
Court wanted to make Congress look foolish—when looking foolish came naturally enough to Congress without
help from the judiciary. I am as cynical as the next person,
but I do not believe that anyone in the legislative branch
meant to bring this tragedy about—to preserve the federal
courts’ formal jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus petitions from state convicts, but to desiccate the courts’
authority genuinely to adjudicate prisoners’ claims, to
stage fights that only wardens can win, and, into the bargain, to condemn our federal courts to wrestle with
intricate procedural puzzles that require laborious litigation to sort out.

A.

Long before 1996, state prisoners were required to pursue
state avenues for litigating federal claims before seeking
federal habeas corpus relief. Nothing in AEDPA purported
to dilute the “exhaustion” doctrine, and, as I have explained,
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions had tightened the
rules governing prisoners’ obligation.5 But AEDPA did
establish a limitations period for filing federal habeas
petitions. Immediately, there was tension. The exhaustion requirement demanded that prisoners file federal
petitions late (after exhausting the remedies available in
state court), while the limitations period forced prisoners
to file early (usually one year from the conclusion of
direct review).
At first, the Supreme Court reconciled the new limitations period with the exhaustion doctrine in existing law.
The justices acknowledged that an accompanying tolling
provision suspended the federal filing period while a “properly filed” application for state post-conviction relief was
pending. And they held that an application for state relief
was “properly filed” if it met the applicable state rules governing the initiation of legal proceedings.6 So far, so good.
Soon, however, the Court declared that a state petition
was not “properly filed” if it was untimely as a matter of
state law.7 Accordingly, an unseasonable state application
would not toll the limitations period for a federal habeas
petition. If the federal limitations period ran out before
the state courts decided that a state application had been
filed too late, the prisoner would be barred from federal
court. The justices acknowledged that this reading of the
tolling provision presented a dilemma, and they offered a
solution. A prisoner who worried that his state petition
might ultimately be ruled untimely (and thus insufficient
to stop the federal clock) could file an immediate federal

B.

Before 1996, the Court held that prisoners were obliged to
follow state rules for adjudicating the facts said to support
federal claims. If a prisoner didn’t do that, he or she typically forfeited the opportunity to offer evidence in federal
habeas corpus proceedings—unless the petitioner could
show “cause” for his default in state court as well as “prejudice,” or, in the alternative, probable innocence.9 A
provision in AEDPA stated that a prisoner who “failed”
to develop facts in state court could obtain a federal
hearing only if he met much more stringent standards
that scarcely anyone would be able to satisfy.
At first, there was hope. The Supreme Court essentially reconciled this new provision with its own case law,
holding that a petitioner had not “failed” to develop the
facts in state court unless he was at fault for inadequate
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II.

I begin with procedural issues, not because they are most
important. They are not. Yet they vividly illustrate the folly
of reading AEDPA’s provisions as though they were carefully and knowledgeably constructed IRS regulations
plainly meant to change current law for some reason,
however obscure.

petition as a hedge against that contingency. Get this now.
In order to comply with the limitations period established
by AEDPA, a prisoner must knowingly file the very premature petition for federal habeas relief that the exhaustion
doctrine discouraged.
Meanwhile, the Court parsed the text of the tolling provision again, now concluding that it stopped the federal
clock only while an application for state post-conviction
relief was pending and thus not while a federal habeas
petition was before a federal court.8 This being so, a prisoner who filed a federal petition within the limitations
period remained at risk. If the federal court took a good
while to decide that the petition was premature under the
exhaustion doctrine and then dismissed it, the prisoner
would have no time to pursue state remedies and return
to federal court before the limitations period elapsed. To
forestall that possibility, a prisoner might simultaneously
file an application for state relief—not because he genuinely believed that he must to satisfy the exhaustion
doctrine, but because only a petition in state court would
toll the filing period for purposes of the federal petition
the prisoner actually wanted to press.
Put all this together for habeas petitioners today.
Under the Court’s interpretations, a prisoner who worries
that an application for state relief won’t stop the federal
clock must worry, too, that a premature “hedge” federal
petition won’t do the job, either. And a prisoner who worries that there is a risk that the federal filing period will
expire while a federal habeas petition is pending must
worry, too, that a concurrent “hedge” application for state
relief is not fail-safe. The cautious and conscientious prisoner attempting to navigate competing procedural
requirements ends up litigating suits in state and federal
court at the same time, when the whole point of the
exhaustion doctrine and, I submit, the tolling provision is
to encourage a rational sequence—litigation first in state
court and then in federal habeas proceedings. No one in
Congress knowingly set things up this way. It is only the
Supreme Court’s interpretive methodology that produces
such perverse results.
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C.

Prior to 1996, the Supreme Court handled multiple federal habeas petitions more or less in the way it treated
procedural default in state court. A prisoner could
advance another federal petition presenting an additional
claim only if he showed “cause” and “prejudice” or probable innocence.12 A provision in AEDPA specified that
another claim could be raised in a “second or successive”
federal petition only if extremely stringent standards were
satisfied—standards, here again, that few prisoners
would ever meet.
Once again, the Supreme Court at first essentially
folded the new provision into existing case law on what
counted as a “second or successive” petition for federal
relief. The Court explained that if a prisoner had no fair
chance to include a claim in a previous application, a second-in-time petition raising the claim was not “second or
successive” as that label was conventionally used and was
therefore not subject to the new criteria.13 A bit later, however, some of the justices signaled impatience with this
reading and a willingness to say, to the contrary, that
AEDPA abandoned the settled understanding of what
counted as a “second or successive” petition.
There is reason to think that the Court will shortly
declare that any second-in-time application challenging
the same conviction or sentence must meet the demanding standards in the statute.14 If that view prevails, then in
this context, too, AEDPA will be read to alter habeas corpus law, whether or not the change makes sense.
D.

I do not say that the Court has invariably arrived at strange
or silly interpretations of AEDPA’s procedural provisions
or that it has relentlessly demanded that every nuance of
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language in every provision must bear serious programmatic implications. I do say that the justices have time and
again adopted constructions that produce objectionable
results and that they have typically read AEDPA to make
changes in procedural restrictions the Court itself had
established—this last ostensibly for the very purpose of
giving AEDPA serious consequences. The illustrations I
have sketched here are not alone, not by a long shot.15
III.

I come finally to substantive limits on federal court authority. Prior to 1996, it had long been settled that when a
federal court was able to reach the merits of a federal claim,
the court was authorized and obligated to exercise independent judgment.16 By common account, that meant de novo
judgment—without regard to any previous state court decision regarding the same claim. No serious observer thought
federal courts actually ignored state court conclusions about
federal rights; the data suggested quite the contrary. Yet the
formal freedom to second-guess state courts was well established and accepted. Then again, the Teague doctrine bore
enormously important practical implications. If a prisoner’s
claim depended on a “new” rule of law within the meaning
of Teague—that is, if a state court might reasonably have
decided the claim against the prisoner at the conclusion of
direct review—a federal habeas court was typically unable to
entertain the claim at all.
Into this (already odd) picture entered AEDPA’s most
important provision, § 2254(d)(1), which stated that a federal habeas application could not be “granted” with respect
to a claim that had been “adjudicated on the merits in
State court,” unless the state adjudication had produced a
“decision” that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court. . . .” This curious provision, entirely new with AEDPA, excited no end of
academic speculation. The crucial question was what, if
anything, the Supreme Court would make of it.
In the early going, there was just the chance that the
answer would be not much. Justice Souter worried aloud
that if the Court interpreted § 2254(d)(1) “literally,” it
would produce a system so complicated that it would be
impossible to administer. He suggested, instead, that Congress had only legislated a “mood.” Congress had asked
federal habeas courts to “pay attention” to what state
judges said about the merits of federal claims, to remember that they were “judges, too.”17 If Souter’s view had
prevailed, § 2254(d)(1) would have had no great disruptive
effect on existing arrangements. Again, federal courts
already were typically satisfied with prior state decisions.
Sadly, on this occasion, too, the full Court chose a different course: the precise text of § 2254(d)(1) had to be
given operational meaning and a meaning that would
break with the known habeas world.18 According to the
Court, this provision did not explicitly uproot a federal
court’s responsibility to exercise independent judgment.
But where a state court had previously rejected a federal
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state fact-finding.10 On this reading, a prisoner who had
exercised diligence in state proceedings didn’t have to
pass the severe tests set out in the new provision. Thus
the Court did essentially what I anticipated.
But it was too good to last. A few years later, the justices seized upon another AEDPA provision and read it
largely to deny even diligent petitioners the ability to present newly discovered evidence in federal court. I will call
this different provision by name, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
because it figures prominently in the AEDPA story, and I
mean to discuss it more fully in Part III. In this instance,
the Court read § 2254(d)(1) to permit a federal court to
grant habeas relief only if a previous state court decision
on the merits of a claim was unreasonable in light of the
evidence the state court saw. It followed, according to the
Court, that a federal court was forbidden to consider additional evidence—even if the prisoner could not be blamed
for the inadequacy of the evidentiary record before the
state court.11 Thus § 2254(d)(1) effectively displaced the
provision previously read to contemplate that diligent
petitioners might present new proof in federal habeas
proceedings.
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Postscript

It’s hard to think that things habeas could be worse than
they are. But they will be soon. AEDPA not only introduced
the provisions I have discussed here (and more), but also
included numerous additional provisions applicable exclusively in death penalty cases. So far, those provisions have
not come into play, because they are triggered only if a
state establishes a qualifying system for providing indigents on death row with competent, properly compensated
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. The Department of Justice will soon announce the conditions a state’s
program must meet. Some state systems are bound to
measure up, and then the Supreme Court will have
another raft of statutory habeas provisions to interpret. If
experience is any guide, we are in for more textualist analysis and, alas, more insistence that every provision on the
list must be given a meaning that changes already bad
habeas arrangements for the worse.
Still, I do not despair. At some point, professionals will
surely draw back, take stock, and set about reconstructing
federal habeas corpus in a sensible, coherent form. The
academic literature is filled with helpful ideas. As this
symposium goes to press, the ABA is preparing revised
standards to guide genuine reform efforts. The writ, meanwhile, is surprisingly resilient, stubbornly hanging on to
serve us and what we hold dear, if we will only set it free.
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claim on the merits, § 2254(d)(1) established a general prohibition on federal habeas relief. The effect was the same; a
federal court wouldn’t make its own determination regarding the merits of a claim if it couldn’t act on a favorable
conclusion by extending relief. There were exceptions. If a
prior state decision on the merits was “contrary to” pertinent Supreme Court precedents or amounted to an
“unreasonable application” of those precedents, a federal
court would be able to grant relief on the strength of its
own determination that the claim was meritorious. Incorporating these exceptions into the general rule, the Court
explained that a federal court could award relief only if it
concluded that a previous state court decision on a claim
was not only incorrect but also unreasonable.19
One might have thought the Court would say next that
§ 2254(d)(1) essentially reproduced the Teague doctrine in
practical effect. Where Teague prevented a federal court
from considering a claim that might reasonably have been
determined against the petitioner, § 2254(d)(1) substituted
a prohibition on federal habeas relief where a state court
had actually held, reasonably, that a claim was without
merit. The one thing that would make no sense would be
to read this new provision to function in tandem with
Teague—that is, to govern the availability of federal habeas
relief regarding claims Teague admitted to the federal
forum in the first place. Yet this is precisely what the Court
did read § 2254(d)(1) to mean. Once again proceeding from
the premise that AEDPA must change existing habeas law,
the Court soon declared that Teague and § 2254(d)(1) were
distinct doctrinal ideas operating seriatim.
How can this work? At the outset, Teague determines
whether a claim is cognizable in federal court. Then, if a
claim is cognizable and meritorious (in the federal court’s
view), § 2254(d)(1) governs the court’s authority to award
habeas relief.20 But consider that a claim is cognizable
under Teague only if, at the time a prisoner’s conviction
and sentence became final on direct review, no court could
reasonably have held against him. In a case in which a state
court actually rejected a claim on the merits, it follows that
the state court must have acted unreasonably, else the
claim wouldn’t have made it through the door. It’s a mystery, then, what function is left for § 2254(d)(1) to perform.
There are cases (more than one would think) in which wardens don’t argue that claims are Teague-barred. But when a
state court decided a claim against the petitioner and the
warden does contend that the claim is foreclosed by Teague,
the reasonableness of the state court’s decision is entailed
in the threshold Teague analysis.
I gloss over lots of details here, and I set aside other
troubling scenarios that the Court’s interpretation of
§ 2254(d)(1) produces. Suffice it to say for present purposes that we now have the very complicated, the very
unnecessarily complicated, system that Justice Souter
warned us against. And we have this system for no better
reason than that the justices now occupying seats on the
Supreme Court persist in a method of statutory construction that is sorely ill-suited to this ham-handed statute.
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